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Abstract: In Asia, there is a surge of interest in the development of Payments 
for Environmental Services (PES) programs. They represent a new approach that 
focuses directly on creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers and 
beneficiaries of environmental services. More specifically, in Vietnam, a Fund 
for the Protection and Development of Forestry has been recently established 
that puts in place the mechanisms for the payment of fees by downstream users 
of watershed services to finance forestry projects in the upper-catchments. 
This paper reviews the potential response of upland farming households to a 
PES scheme that rewards them to set aside part of land for the production of 
environmental services. We examine the viability of PES schemes targeted at 
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agricultural households of the upper-catchments in Northern Vietnam. We focus 
our attention on households identified as the poorest in the upper-catchment 
areas, i.e. those with a small endowment of productive land, limited access 
to water for irrigation, and low access to markets. We find that farmers are 
unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement program unless they are 
‘compensated’ for the loss in food production and a ‘forced’ set aside program is 
likely to generate an overall negative impact on both poverty and environmental 
protection. Development and dissemination of improved technologies that 
increase food yields is a complementary strategy to promote environmental 
protection.
Keywords: Environmental services, land set-aside, modelling, poverty, shifting 
cultivation, Vietnam
Acknowledgement: This paper presents findings from PN11 “Rice Landscape 
Management for Raising Water Productivity, Conserving Resources, and Improving 
Livelihoods in Upper Catchments of the Mekong and Red River Basins”, a project 
of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. Additional funds from 
the Theme 2 PES initiative were also used to obtain the specific results on PES 
impact.
1. Introduction
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that 
focuses directly on creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers of 
environmental services, in this case the uplanders, and the downstream beneficiaries 
of these services. PES schemes are based on the principles that those who benefit 
from environmental services should pay for them, and that those who contribute to 
generating these services should be compensated for providing them. Hence, the 
approach seeks to create mechanisms that internalize what would otherwise be an 
externality (Pagiola et al. 2008). Such schemes can take the advantage of upland-
lowland interactions in generating environmental benefits while improving the 
livelihoods of upper-catchment agricultural households.
The past few years have witnessed a surge of interest in the development 
of PES schemes in Asia (e.g. Boquiren 2004; Pattanayak 2004; Suyanto et al. 
2005). In Vietnam, while some projects using the conceptual framework of 
PES are being initiated in the central and southern part of the country (e.g. 
WWF 2007), no PES schemes are currently being implemented in the upper 
catchment areas of Northern Vietnam (Wunder et al. 2005). However, the 
Vietnamese government expressed recently its interest in starting such a scheme 
to protect fragile upper-catchments whose degradations are causing problems, 
among others, on hydro-electric infrastructures. In particular, the Vietnamese 
government recently created a « Fund for the Protection and Development 
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of Forestry » that puts in place the mechanisms for the payment of fees by 
downstream users of watershed services to this fund. The money collected 
will then be used to finance forestry projects in the upper-catchments. For the 
moment, the main potential payees are the hydro-power plants, and the tourism 
industry (Government of Vietnam 2008), and the main potential beneficiaries 
would be farming households.
Deforestation and slash-and-burn cultivation techniques are often blamed 
as the main causes of land degradation and deforestation in upper-catchments. 
A mix of incentives (subsidies), technical assistance on improved and sustainable 
agricultural practices, and regulation have been used to address the problem. 
However, such practices have not been widely adopted by farmers. In an 
attempt to meet their short-term livelihood needs, many agricultural households 
are still employing agricultural practices that are unsustainable in the long term. 
Land use practices, which would bring about environmental benefits, include 
forest plantation, agro-forestry systems, tree-based land use alternatives, and 
agro-ecologically sound practices such as conservation agriculture (Gouyon 
2002). However, the environmental services these land use practices provide, 
i.e. watershed services, biodiversity conservation and carbon storage are usually 
un-rewarded and only indirectly connected to economic activities (The et al. 
2004).
Agricultural households in upper-catchments have unequal access to natural 
resources. The upper-catchments are generally composed of narrow valley 
bottoms where irrigated rice fields are found and of surrounding sloping land 
where upland rice, maize and cassava are the principal crops. Forested areas 
are scattered on the sloping land and are now usually found at large distances 
from villages. The differential access to these land resources is an important 
determinant of household farming practices and livelihood strategies.
The main objective of this paper is to review the potential response of upland 
households to a PES scheme that rewards them to set aside part of land for the 
production of environmental services. 
In the first section of this paper, we review briefly the economic literature 
on PES and their potential impact on poverty. This review focuses on papers 
that unveil the possibility of negative impact on poor farming households that 
can not participate as service providers in a potential PES program. Given the 
possibility of negative impacts, we propose a framework to evaluate ex-ante 
the response of poor farming households in the Northern provinces of Vietnam. 
The second section describes the study area and the current farming systems. 
Then we propose a stylised typology of farming households in that region. In the 
third section of the paper, we develop a farm household model, and show how 
it can be used to anticipate farmers’ participation in potential PES programs and 
impact on their production strategy. Finally, in the fourth section, we examine the 
likely viability of PES schemes targeted at agricultural households of the upper-
catchments in Northern Vietnam. We focus our attention on households identified 
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as the poorest in the upper-catchment areas, i.e. those with a small endowment of 
productive land, limited access to water for irrigation, and low access to markets. 
We find that farmers are unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement 
program unless they are ‘compensated’ for the loss in food production through 
in-kind grain transfers or through the promotion of technologies that increase 
food yields.
2. PeS and poverty
PES approach was initially conceptualized and undertaken as a mechanism 
to improve the efficiency of natural resource management, and not really as 
a mechanism for poverty reduction (Pagiola et al. 2005). However, the recent 
attractiveness of PES to policy-makers is that both environmental degradation and 
rural poverty in upper-catchments may be mitigated by this approach (Landell-
Mills and Porras 2002). 
However, some authors have also warned that the impact of PES 
programs on poverty may not always be positive (Wunder 2005). Land and 
labour market conditions can affect both participants and non-participants 
of PES programs. First, with insecure tenure, poor households in target 
areas may be evicted by powerful groups willing to capture the increased 
value of previously marginal land (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). Second, 
PES schemes may have a positive impact on those who participate but a 
negative impact on poor households that are unable to participate, or on poor 
consumers. For example, a PES program that limits access to forested land 
may also exacerbate problems of landless households and herders, whose 
livelihoods depend crucially on gathering forest products (Kerr 2002). Third, 
PES can have a negative impact on farmers with small land area who derive 
most of their incomes as agricultural wage labour (Zilberman et al. 2008). 
Fourth, PES does not always result in poverty reduction as targeted poor 
households may be unwilling to participate if PES payments do not cover the 
opportunity costs of requested land-use adjustments (Wunder 2008). Finally, 
the targeted producers of environmental services may be unable to participate 
in the PES program because of insecure land tenure, lack of land title, small 
farm holdings, or lack of access to credit to undertake investments such as 
reforestation (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Pagiola et al. 2005).
This paper concentrates on the viability of participation of upland 
farming households in PES programs. An ex-ante analysis of the potential 
behaviour of farmers is proposed that takes into account their resource 
endowments, income levels and livelihood strategies. The focus of the paper 
is on households identified as the poorest in the upper-catchment areas, i.e. 
those with a small endowment of productive land, limited access to water 
for irrigation, and low access to markets. The specific policy intervention 
considered is a set-aside program that rewards farmers for retiring all or part 
of their land from food production. 
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3.  A large diversity of situations in the upper-catchments  
of Vietnam
3.1. Study area
Most of the empirical work was conducted in the district of Van Chan of the Yen 
Bai province (Figure 1). This district, containing part of the Hoang Lien mountain 
range, is surrounded by the Red and the Black Rivers. Two communes, Nam Bung 
and Suoi Giang, have been selected for their contrasted characteristics in terms of 
water regimes, i.e. the ratio of lowland to upland areas, and access to markets. Both 
communes are situated at an average height of 900 m.a.s.l. and are populated by 
ethnic minorities, mainly Thai, Hmong and Dao. Both communes contain a large 
diversity of small catchments typical of the Northern provinces of Vietnam.
Upper-catchments are composed of narrow flat valley bottoms, usually used 
for paddy production, surrounded by sloping land. Terraces are also found in 
higher areas of the catchments. These terraces are either irrigated when sufficient 
water flows can be captured, or are conducted as rainfed lowland terraces. In 
either ways those terraces allow the use of draft power, and are affecting water 
flows within the catchment. Finally, distant forested areas provide the ground for 
Figure 1: Map of Vietnam, with indication of the study area in Yen Bai Province.
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complementary food needs e.g. hunting, fruit collection, and other non-timber 
forest products (Figure 2).
Agricultural households are conducting contrasted agricultural activities in 
those different compartments. In the valley bottoms, irrigated rice is cultivated 
continuously. Several rice crops are sometimes cultivated within one calendar 
year, depending on local conditions and farms constraints. Depending on their 
connection to markets and their financial constraints, farmers will use highly 
variable levels of external inputs such as hybrid rice, fertilizers and insecticides. 
However, for cash constrained households, only traditional rice varieties with no 
chemical inputs cropping systems are possible. On upper terraces, lack of water 
during the dry season reduces the possibilities to one rainfed lowland rice crop per 
year. However, other crops, such as maize and soybean are also found. 
In contrast, agricultural activities are not continuous on the sloping land. 
Farmers alternate cultivation periods with fallow periods. In the study area, a 
typical cropping rotation will alternate eight to nine successive years of cropping 
with fallow. This sequence includes one to two years of dry-land rice cultivation, 
followed by two to three maize cropping years and several years of cassava 
cropping. Then, land is returned to fallow for several years before this cropping 
cycle is started again. 
3.2. A typology of household situations
In upper-catchment areas, the major determinants of household livelihoods are 
land endowments, access to markets, and access to irrigation. Land endowments 
include not only the farm size but also the relative proportion of sloping uplands 
where rice is grown under dry-land conditions and paddy fields (such as terraced 
areas in lower slopes and valley bottoms) where rice is grown under wetland 
Figure 2: A cross-section of a typical upper-catchment in the Northern mountainous provinces 
of Vietnam.
Sloping
area
Lowland paddies
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conditions. Rice grown in paddy fields generally produces higher yields than grown 
in sloping fields. For a given farm size, households who have a higher proportion 
of paddies are hence more food secure than those with a higher proportion of 
sloping uplands. In addition, those who meet most of their rice requirements from 
paddy fields are likely to grow non-food crops in the sloping uplands. This effect 
is reinforced if the lowland fields are irrigated. 
Access to markets (inputs, outputs, and off-farm employment) is another 
important determinant of livelihood strategies. Production systems tend to be 
subsistence-oriented in areas with poor access to markets. Commercial production 
systems evolve when access to markets is good. 
Of the three main differentiating factors, the impact of access to water is 
mediated mainly through paddies where more intensive production of rice is 
possible when irrigation is available. The access to water is considered as a sub-
category within the households with lowland plots. Hence, households can be 
classified into four categories based on the share of lowland in total farm area and 
access to markets (Table 1).
Farmers of the first group cultivate fragile sloping lands for their food 
needs. Fallow-rotation upland rice based systems are used: secondary 
vegetation is cut and burned, upland rice is cultivated for one or two seasons, 
followed by maize and cassava. After a few years of cultivation, land is left to 
fallow. The families usually complement food needs with products collected 
in surrounding forested areas. Food productivity tends to decline over time 
as land use is intensified (or fallow cycle is reduced) in response to rising 
population pressure. 
Good access to markets offers the second group of farmers, who basically face 
the same constraints as the first group, more choices in their livelihood strategies. 
Off-farm work allows them to obtain monetary incomes. Purchased inputs can be 
used to prevent the decline in food productivity. Also, farmers can purchase food 
from the market when needed. The resulting environmental effects in sloping 
uplands tend to be positive or negative depending on whether farmers switch to 
perennial crops or intensify the land use in favour of annual crops. For example, 
the replacement of existing rice-fallow cultivation systems to maize-cassava 
continuous cropping systems for animal feed is likely to increase soil erosion and 
the associated negative externalities on downstream users. 
Table 1: Simplified typology of households in upper-catchments.
Land endowment
Higher proportion of sloping upland Higher proportion of paddy land
Access to markets Poor 1. Subsistence upland rice farming 3. Subsistence paddy farming 
Good 2.  Commercial production of crops 
for markets
4.  Commercial production in upland 
with rice in paddies
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Of the four groups identified, farmers of group 1 tend to be the poorest and 
also the most vulnerable. Intensification of land use can take the form of reduced 
fallow periods or encroachment to forests—both producing negative externalities 
in terms of the environmental effects. Farmers of groups 2 and 4 are also likely 
to create substantial negative externalities on downstream users, especially those 
that grow annual crops in sloping areas; yet, their livelihoods are more resilient 
due to the opportunities provided by markets or due to a higher endowment with 
paddies for rice production, respectively. 
For the remaining part of this paper, we will therefore concentrate on the 
impact of the PES scheme on the first group of farmers. A small model of their 
production systems will be developed, and simulations will be conducted to 
analyse their potential reactions to different types of PES schemes. 
4. Modelling land use decisions of shifting cultivators
The model developed in this paper integrates the dynamics of soil fertility over time 
in a fallow rotation system and farmer decisions on labour allocation to farming. 
Shifting cultivation systems are characterized by alternating fallow and cropping 
cycles. The rationale for discontinuing cropping is two-fold. First, fragile sloping 
soils are degrading fast and crop yields tend to fall rapidly once the vegetation 
has been cleared. Since no external inputs are used to compensate for fertility 
losses, fallow periods are used to restore naturally the stock of nutrients in the 
soil. The time needed to restore soil fertility varies according to the climate and 
soil characteristics. In tropical rainforests, this may take 8 to 12 years (Ruthenberg 
1980). Second, abandonment of fields after a few years of cultivation is also 
related to the invasion of weeds causing a sharp reduction of labour productivity 
after a few years of cropping in the absence of herbicide use.
For these subsistence-oriented shifting cultivation systems, a field cropped 
in the preceding season is left fallow if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the 
discounted projected benefit stream of continued cultivation, calculated over 
a certain period is less than the one associated with the alternative options of 
concentrating efforts on the other opened fields, or by opening a new field, and (2) 
food production does not fall below the household food minimum requirements.
4.1. Household objectives
Upland farmers have many objectives, often conflicting ones. Achieving food 
security and increasing household incomes are two examples of objectives. 
The final decision making depends on these multiple objectives and how the 
households weigh achievements of various objectives against each other. 
Theoretical models of household decision making are based on the maximization 
of ‘subjective’ utility (Nakajima 1970). The objective function is often simplified 
for empirical modelling in terms of the income level achieved and food needs 
satisfied. Poorly-developed marketing infrastructure and institutions in remote 
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uplands also force such simplifications by constraining the application of 
household economy models that consider both the consumption and production 
side together with the markets linkages (Singh et al. 1986). 
In the simplification used here, a household is assumed to minimize the total 
labour use in food production subject to satisfying the family food requirements. 
This assumption implies that the household is basically subsistence-oriented with 
very limited interaction with markets (Group 1 household in Table 1). In the real 
world, upland farmers do have some interactions with the market and make land/
labour use decisions in the light of market opportunities. In fact, most farmers fall 
somewhere in a continuum between fully subsistence-oriented and fully market-
oriented. Analysis based on these extreme scenarios, although unlikely to be 
observed in the real world, can help generate insights into the farmer behaviour as 
conditions approach either fully market- or fully subsistence-oriented production. 
The quantitative modelling included in this paper is based on the assumption of 
fully subsistence-oriented production. 
4.2. Temporal considerations
Most conservation decisions involve inter-temporal trade-offs: immediate gains 
of an action must be balanced against associated long term losses. Nevertheless, 
most farmers with pressing subsistence needs have high discount rates, resulting 
in very short planning horizons. Still, decisions taken at one point of time will 
influence future outputs and decisions. Hence, we used a recursive model, where 
households take decisions annually with short-term planning horizon, but have to 
bear the consequences of their previous choices.
4.3. Model structure and dynamics
Farmers make a number of decisions that are potentially relevant for the 
management of natural resources: cropping and fallow periods, crop choice, 
labour and other inputs, soil conservation investments, etc. We focused on three 
main interlinked mechanisms: nutrient dynamics, cropping and fallow periods, 
and labour allocation decision. 
The model reproduces decisions of a farmer who has been allocated a given 
area of sloping land for individual management. 
The following additional assumptions were also made:
•	 Land available to the household is fixed. Therefore, expansion of 
agricultural activities into open-access forest is not an option as is the case 
in Vietnam.
•	 Food requirements and labour supply are time invariant. 
•	 It is assumed that the fertility status of each field f at period t can be described 
by only one parameter FERT(f, t). This implies that one single nutrient is 
assumed to be globally limiting the production.
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Nutrient dynamics and crop yields are influenced by household decisions at 
each period, i.e. cropping versus fallowing, and the quantity of labour input into 
crop production. In return, those decisions will be conditioned by the fertility 
status of fields, household food requirements and labour constraints.
4.4. Nutrient dynamics
Household land is divided into a fixed number of fields of equal size, among 
which a variable number is cultivated at any time. The field fertility approaches 
asymptotically a maximum level when the field is left fallow, and decreases 
proportionally when the field is cropped. Similar formulation has been used in 
resource use problems (Van Noordwijk 2002).
During fallow periods, the fertility of each field, FERT(f,t), is updated for each 
time step by assuming that nutrients are re-generated at a rate depending on the 
initial fertility status of the field.
FERT f t FERT f t fertM FERT f t( , ) ( , ) . exp ( ( , ))+ = + − −




1 11
2
α α


 
(1)
Equation 1 ensures that the fertility of a given field in the next period is determined 
as the sum of its current fertility, plus a second term expressing the accumulation 
of fallow vegetation in the field, and in the soil. Equation 1, through the coefficient 
α1 and α2, ensures that large fertility increases are possible if the fertility is far 
below its maximum level fertM, and that fertility increases are decreasing as 
FERT approaches fertM. 
During cultivation periods, fertility of the field decreases when it is cultivated. 
The fertility decrease is assumed to be proportional to crop yields during the 
season (equation 2)
FERT f t FERT f t YIELD f t( , ) ( , ) . ( , )+ = −1 3α
 
(2)
where α3 determined the fertility decrease per ton of obtained yield.
4.5. Land productivity
Yield obtained in each fields depends on its initial fertility and the labour use. 
Yield will increase asymptotically towards a yield ceiling Y0(t) as field fertility 
or labour input per unit area LAB(f,t) increase. The achievable yield is also 
assumed to be decreasing with the number of successive cultivating years 
(Equation 3). 
YIELD f t Y t c FERT f t
Year f t( , ) ( ). exp
. ( , )
( , ) .= −
−






0
11 1− −( )( )exp . ( , )c LAB f t2
 
(3)
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This production function ensures that marginal productivities of fertility 
and labour inputs are decreasing, and can be considered to be a continuous 
version of the von-Liebig production function (Paris and Knapp 1989; Paris 
1992).
4.6. Land use and labour allocation
As discussed earlier, labour is allocated, fallow land is brought into cultivation 
and cultivated land is left fallow according to household decision rules involving 
factors such as household labour productivity and food sufficiency. The modelled 
households have no access to markets, so it was assumed that households choose 
the number of fields cultivated or left fallow and allocate labour among cultivated 
lands in order to produce enough food. 
For each year, decisions about the number of plots cropped and the labour 
allocated in each of the cropped plot are simulated according the following 
process.
4.7.  Construction of scenarios on which plots should be cropped/left  
fallow 
Four scenarios are built: (1) the household cultivates the same plots that was 
cultivated in the previous year, (2) the household cultivates one new plot and 
do not leave any of the cropped ones fallow, (3) one of the cropped plots is 
left fallow, (4) one plot under fallow is cropped, and one cropped plot is left 
fallow. The plot with the highest value of FERT(f,t) is chosen as the newly 
cropped plot and clearing time (opening(t)) is added to the labour needs. The 
cropped field with the lowest value of FERT(f,t) is chosen as the plot newly 
left fallow. 
4.8. Identification of the most favourable scenario
For each scenario, a non-linear programming model is used to minimize the 
household’s labour input, while producing the required food (equation 4) and 
respecting the family labour constraints (equation 5). For each scenario, the model 
obtains the allocation of labour to each of the cropped field under that scenario. 
This model is implemented using GAMS (Rosenthal 2007) with the non-linear 
programming solver CONOPT2 (Drud 2006).
size f YIELD f t food t
f
( ). ( , ) ( )( ) ≥∑
 
(4)
Where food(t) represents the household food requirements;
size f LAB f t opening t flab t
f
( ). ( , ) ( ) ( )( ) + ≤∑
 
(5)
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where 
• LAB(f,t) is labour allocated to field f (endogenous);
• flab(t) is the household available labour time.
The best scenario is retained and represents the decision taken during the year t. 
4.9. Implementation of the decisions and step forward to the next year
Finally, the soil fertility index of each plot is re-calculated for the next time step 
under that scenario. 
4.10. Base simulation settings and model behaviour
Empirical estimates of parameters for northern Vietnam conditions are not 
available. Parameter values assumed to initialize the model were calibrated 
to produce close resemblance with the upland rice yield trajectory generally 
applicable to upland conditions of northern Vietnam. The yield trajectory was 
constructed from the data generated from a household survey conducted in the 
Van Chan district, Yen Bai province in 2007 (Tai et al. 2007). 
We modelled a farm household with 4 hectares of sloping land with no access 
to water for irrigation. The household labour force comprised of three adults, with 
the household having a total of five family members. Figure 3 (baseline scenario) 
shows the trajectory of the fertility index of a selected field over the years. The 
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Figure 3: Nutrient status over time of one field under base and set-aside scenarios.
76 Damien Jourdain et al.
upward sloping part of the curve corresponds to fallow periods with the downward 
sloping part corresponding to the cultivation periods. A long cropping/fallow 
cycle of an average of 15 years is obtained, with around 5 years of cultivation and 
the remaining time for fallow. For the simulated farm, the average land fertility is 
decreasing over time suggesting that the simulated fallow-rotation systems are not 
sustainable over time. Similar downward long-term trends were observed even 
under different parameter assumptions. 
5. Impact of proposed PeS schemes
The model was used to analyze the impact of policy that would reduce the sloping 
land available for farming for the benefit of forested area. A ‘set-aside’ program 
basically reduces the land area available for use and is simulated by a reduced 
farm size, with other things remaining the same. 
To simulate this scenario, we reduced the cropping area by 1 ha. A sharp 
decrease of soil fertility was observed over time in the area left for cropping. With 
less available land to agriculture, households were forced to reduce the fallow 
periods, and to cultivate their land for longer periods of time (see scenarios 
–25% of Figure 3). There is an overall decrease in the overall average fertility 
status (averaged between cropped and fallow land) despite an improvement 
in the fertility status of the land taken out from crop production over time 
(Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Impact on average plot fertility of a 25% reduction of cropping area without 
compensation.
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When considering the average effects of the scheme over a 20-year period 
with the current simulation coefficients, the impact on the average fertility of land 
(Table 2) is almost the same between the base scenario (no PES), and the scenario 
with PES (–9.5% versus –10.2%).
This result indicates that the overall environmental effects may well be 
negative over time since degradation is more likely to be shifted than really 
stopped. Besides the overall impact on farmers livelihood is negative since they 
have to use more labour to produce the food they need, and the land they control 
is degrading fast.
A mechanism for ensuring that households are able to meet their food needs is 
to compensate them for the lost food production resulting from the withdrawal of 
land. A sustainable land fertility status can be achieved by compensating farmers 
in the form of direct provision part of their food requirements. Such a provision 
may take the form of annual in-kind subsidy of grain. This mechanism was used 
by China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program that compensated farmers who 
converted degraded land to forests (Bennett and Xu 2005). It has to be noted, 
however, that the cost of making such transfers may be too high in remote areas 
to make it a viable strategy except for some limited areas. 
Another solution would be to act upon farmers’ risk induced behaviours. 
As a matter of fact, households’ food requirements include a “buffer surplus” 
to be prepared for a bad climatic event or pest outbreaks. An in-kind insurance 
mechanism that would ensure a minimum grain supply during the low yield years 
is likely to increase the households’ well-being (by decreasing their vulnerability). 
Also, food transfers involved are likely to be less costly as they are limited to 
adverse years only. Nevertheless, the total cost will be substantial unless the 
program is limited to only a small area. 
An effective and viable strategy to promote set-aside of land is to increase 
the yield per unit of agricultural land through the public provision of improved 
agricultural technologies. Pressure to intensify land use can be reduced if crop 
yields are higher as farmers will be able to meet their food needs from a smaller 
area. The success of ‘return land to forest’ program in the uplands of Yunnan, China 
is partly due to the availability of high yielding upland rice technologies (Pandey 
et al. 2005). In addition, such technologies help promote income generation by 
Table 2: Variation of the average fertility index over a period of 20 years with a 25% reduction 
of cropping area without compensation.
Base scenario With 25% reduction of upland cropping area
Year Average Cultivated area Protected area Weighted average
1  89.2  88.7  88.0  88.6
20  80.8  69.7 108.9  79.5
% Variation –9.5% –21.4%  23.8% –10.2%
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releasing resources (land and labour) that can be used to produce market-oriented 
crops without sacrificing the household food security. Investments in agricultural 
R&D and technology promotion may be considered by rural communities as 
a part of broader development interventions, not a part of PES. Nevertheless, 
at the sectoral level, such investments can be seen as a strategy to promote 
environmentally beneficial changes in land use. 
6. Discussion and conclusion
This article developed a recursive dynamic model of shifting cultivators that 
integrated the dynamics of soil fertility over time and farmers decisions in order 
to analyse the potential effect of their participations in PES programs. The model 
predicted that farmers are unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement 
program unless they are ‘compensated’ for the loss in food production through 
in-kind grain transfers or through the promotion of technologies that increase 
crop yields.
The article also showed that if households are somehow forced into the 
program, through top-down selection of protected areas, this induces a reduction 
of environmental degradation in targeted zones, but an increase of environmental 
degradation on the remaining part of their land-holding. The overall net environ-
mental effect could actually be negative. In addition, the overall effect on poverty 
would be negative since labour productivity diminishes progressively and farmers’ 
food supply becomes more insecure.
This study used a simplified model of household behaviour in situations 
with limited access to markets. This forces farmers to intensify land use to meet 
the food requirement from the remaining farm area as land is set aside from 
agricultural production. An improvement in the access to markets and non-
farm employment opportunities can relax this constraint by enhancing farmers’ 
overall food entitlements even when production accounts for only a part of the 
total requirements. Environmentally beneficial land use patterns can evolve in a 
commercially-oriented system if property rights to land are well-defined (Pandey 
and Lapar 1998). Voluntary participation in PES schemes is also more likely when 
food entitlements can be enhanced through market participation. 
Second, we have not studied the possibility of technological change that 
could be induced by a PES scheme. Technical solutions such as direct-seeding 
over mulch cropping systems (DMC) are potential alternatives to slash and burn 
practices for land-constrained farm households of the upper-catchments (Husson 
et al. 2000). When adopted, these technologies can generate positive externalities 
to downstream users through erosion control. However, a recent study carried 
out in Northern provinces of Vietnam shows that the adoption of these DMC 
systems is not immediately profitable for farming households (Affholder et al. 
2008). Compensating farmers for the transition costs linked to the adoption of this 
new technology could potentially be very effective. 
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More generally, support to development and dissemination of improved 
technologies that raise land productivity is an important strategy to reduce the 
intensification pressure in fragile and to prevent environmental degradation. Such 
technologies could be considered as part of the larger schemes for encouraging 
farmers to adopt environmentally superior production and land use practices. 
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